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A DESIGN PERSPECTIVE ON POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: 
THE FALLACIES OF MISPLACED PRESCRIPTION 
Implementation has become a social science concept which, by becoming 
so popular and being used so often, has lost any clarity and at times ap- 
pears to lose all meaning. After the initial Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) 
discussion, the word "implementation" has been used to describe a huge 
number of policy decisions. Even more importantly for our undertaking in 
this paper, it  has been used to t ry  to explain the success or failure of a 
number of policy interventions, and even has been proposed as a means of 
understanding political systems taken more broadly (Hjern & Hull, 1982). 
There is a growing wave of analysts who state, either implicitly or expli- 
citly, that i f  implementation is understood and is successfully designed 
then the policy will be a success. 
There may well be logical and empirical quibbles with the belief that im- 
plementation determines policy. However, we wish to raise a more funda- 
mental point concerning the implementation literature. As we will amplify 
later, the logic of implementation has been extended to say that policy for- 
mulation should be oriented around implementation; we should do what we 
know how to implement well. In adopting this stance, the literature con- 
flates empirical and normative statements, and implicitly if  not explicitly 
argues that ease of implementation is the best criterion for judging "good 
policy." We believe that such a stance constitutes a serious misdirection 
of the policy sciences. 
Our argument, stated simply, is that the concentration on implementa- 
tion has added little to our theoretical understanding of policymaking be- 
yond the fundamental idea that implementation cannot be taken for granted 
in a complex policymaking environment. Further, i t  has normative implica- 
tions for the conduct of policy analysis which may be highly undesirable. 
The structure of our argument is built on the contrast between the ap- 
proach to policymaking implicit in a concentration on implementation and 
that involved in a more explicit emphasis on policy design. Based on this 
contrast, we will emphasize a general approach to the design of both policy 
instruments and their implementation structures which can subsume most 
implementation analysis. Such an approach will stress a more appropriate 
concern with the characteristics of policy options and instruments inherent 
in a design approach (Dryzek, 1983; Linder & Peters, 1984). Our purpose 
here is not so much to attack and attempt to supplant the implementation 
focus as i t  is to build on i ts  insights to develop a more positive approach 
to policymaking. 
Implementation studies have been useful in alerting the unwary to diffi- 
culties involved in making complex policy systems function in the manner 
desired, but they must develop beyond that to make more constructive 
statements about the prospective design of implementation systems and the 
linkage of policy goals to policy instruments. Unfortunately, rather than 
attacking that problem directly, much of the literature seemingly has tacit- 
ly accepted the proposition that the outcome of policymaking is determined 
459 
460 Pol icy  Studies Review, February 1987, 6:3 
at the lowest, "street level" in public organizations and have almost con- 
verted that essentially descriptive point into a normative stance. 
In addition to distinguishing between descriptive and prescriptive state- 
ments, we must also distinguish analytic statements from descriptions of 
the policymaking process. Our concern with policy design may imply, at 
least to some readers, a more integrated and rationalistic political system 
than the one with which we are most familiar. This is too restrictive a 
view of design. The incremental nature of most policymaking should nei- 
ther impede efforts to bring systematic reasoning to bear on policy formu- 
lation nor deter analysts from attempting to understand better the charac- 
teristics of public policies and the means for improving their performance. 
Most implementation research has taken both policy and the political system 
as givens. We are assuming that the political system is a given, but that 
policy can be better designed to meet conditions prevailing in that political 
system. Unlike some implementation literature, however, we do not regard 
political feasibility as the only, or  perhaps even the most important, cri- 
terion when considering policy. Feasibility is important but should not 
drive the selection of policy to the extent implied by students of implemen- 
tation. There are other political, economic and ethical criteria which must 
be considered along with feasibility when designing public policies. 
IMPLEMENTATION: THE LITERATURE 
A s  noted, there is now a very large body of literature which can be 
described as implementation studies. This literature can be divided into 
two very broad groups, which we label "The Horrors of War'! and !'The 
Search for Theory," with the second and more important of those contain- 
ing four major theoretical views of implementation. 
The Horrors of War 
The first group of studies can be termed somewhat facetiously the "hor- 
rors of war" approach to implementation, or as Rein (1983) termed i t ,  the 
"nothing works" approach. The title of this section is intended to convey 
the tendency of this body of writing to describe the numerous barriers to 
effective implementation. A less fanciful characterization of this work is as 
"the search for perfect administration" (Hogwood 8r Gunn, 1984; Hood, 
1976). Most of this work has involved essentially a cataloging approach to 
the barriers to perfect administration, describing them and (in some in- 
stances) analyzing their characteristics, but really doing little else to aid 
in the development of effective policymaking systems. 
This approach to implementation began long before the use of the term 
came into vogue. Much traditional literature on public administration has 
something of this about i t .  The development of the Ilproverbs of adminis- 
tration" (Simon, 1947) was the result of efforts to understand why organi- 
zations did not function as  effectively as they might and, unlike other re- 
cent literature, to propose solutions for those real or perceived problems. 
The value of the "horrors of war" approach to implementation is demon- 
strated by Chris Hood's The Limits of Administration (1976). This is an 
excellent analysis of why traditionally organized hierarchical public organi- 
zations may not function effectively. Hood develops an analytic model of 
"perfect administration" and discusses a set of categories describing the 
problems preventing perfect administration from occurring, and then 
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proceeds to analyze the dynamics of administrative failure. Although the 
term "implementationfT was used rarely in this book, it is an extremely per- 
ceptive description of the problems of putting public programs into effect. 
Unfortunately, not all of the literature with a 'Ihorrors of war" orienta- 
tion to implementation is as useful as Hood. The large majority of this lit- 
erature does little more than list things which can go wrong. There is 
little or no attempt to develop any dynamic model of the policymaking proc- 
ess which could explain such failures in policymaking more generally, or to 
provide any real guidance about amelioration of the problems. 
What this approach does, however, is to imply (if not always explicitly 
state) that the majority of failures in the policy process are the results of 
failures in administration. I t  appears to assume that if we could only find 
means to coerce bureaucrats and the private organizations charged with 
implementing public programs to do as they should then our policymaking 
problems would be solved. Also, a great deal of this literature does not 
make the differentiation between failures of implementation and other fail- 
ures in making public policy (Sieber, 1981; Hogwood & Peters, 1985). 
Some programs may be implemented perfectly and still be failures, or per- 
haps even have results opposite of those intended. Thus, placing all our 
emphasis on failures of implementation may direct attention away from as- 
pects of policymaking which are at once more important and actually easier 
to correct. It is much simpler to remedy design failures in public pro- 
grams before they are put into the field than to alter the behavior of or- 
ganizations and individuals after the program has been initiated. Inter- 
estingly, then, a field of study which began with an interest in pointing 
out the political realities which faced the naive has itself seemingly done 
little broad thinking about the manner in which the political system func- 
tions, and has tended to concentrate i ts  attention on the most difficult 
parts of policymaking to change. As we will point out, this seemingly has 
led to an acceptance of their fate. 
It would be worthwhile at this point to discuss three alternative types 
of failure which any policy may encounter along its path to fruition. The 
first, as we have been discussing is implementation failure. This occurs 
when a program or policy which, in other respects, is quite reasonable 
and potentially effective is sabotaged during implementation. Such sabo- 
tage may be intentional or accidental, but the ultimate outcome is that what 
was promulgated into law did not go into effect because of the process by  
which i t  was implemented or the resistance of individuals o r  groups which 
were charged with i t s  implementation. This may be the least common cause 
of the policy failure. 
A second cause of failure is policy design, or the failure of those mak- 
ing policy to formulate a program which had any possibility of being suc- 
cessful. Some programs are simply TTcrippled at birth" (Hogwood & Peters, 
1985) and the best public bureaucracies in the world would have no chance 
of making them successful. These design failures may be the result of ex- 
cessive ambition (e.g., some antipoverty legislation in the United States) 
or the result of misunderstanding of the nature of the problem (e.g. ,  some 
anticrime legislation), but for whatever reason the solutions chosen simply 
do not correspond with the problems ostensibly being addressed. 
Finally, there can be pol;cy failures in which a program may, or may 
not, achieve i ts  goals, but creates so many negative side effects that the 
cure may be worse than the disease (Sieber, 1981). For example, some 
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welfare programs may achieve their stated goals of making cash payments 
to certain classes of individuals, but the restrictions upon eligibility may 
have very negative effects upon other social values, such as family struc- 
ture. In this case, even if  the policy per se were to be considered a suc- 
cess, and it was successfully implemented, the total social impact of the 
policy may be negative. If we look at interactions of any program with an 
array of other programs, then the number of policy failures may be in- 
creased. 
The general point to be made is that implementation is but one reason 
why policies do not succeed, and to place all of our scholarly emphasis on 
that one cause is to misunderstand the problem. As Mayntz (1983, p. 124) 
has written : 
To a certain extent it is a methodological requirement of imple- 
mentation research to treat the programme as a given in order to 
have a baseline for defining what perfect or faulty administration 
consists of in the particular case. But this methodological de- 
vice can surreptitiously become an implicit assumption, i. e. that 
all is well if only the programme gets implemented as designed. 
Implementation research itself has shown that such an assumption 
is manifestly false in many cases. While it remains true that 
poor implementation can ruin the best of policies, it is also true 
that perfect implementation does not assure realisation of policy 
goals if the programme takes the wrong approach. 
The Search for Theory: The Four Major Views 
Providing catalogs of implementation failures and barriers to perfect ad- - - 
ministration is useful, but does not carry the development of useful theory 
about policymaking very far. Rather, more explicit attempts at under- 
standing of the dynamics of implementation must be made, and these con- 
stitute the second broad category of the implementation literature. The 
work which has been conducted in this area can be broadly classified into 
"top down" and "bottom upfT approaches. The 9op  downff perspective on 
implementation views the problem from the vantage point of a manager o r  a 
politician who wishes to see some particular action occur. A s  in the "per- 
fect administrationvf approach, this approach to some extent is oriented to- 
ward barriers to effective management. The "bottom up" approach takes 
quite a different perspective, arguing for the importance of the lowest 
echelons of the organization in defining the true meaning of public poli- 
ties. Rather than being interested in command and control, the "bottom 
up" perspective is concerned with the bargaining necessary to have a poli- 
cy implemented, and the resulting changes which may occur within the pol- 
icy. We will now proceed to briefly discuss each of these approaches, al- 
though giving much greater emphasis to the bottom up approach. We wil l  
also discuss several other theoretical approaches which, although not SO 
pervasive, do provide additional insights into the implementation process. 
The Top Down Perspective. As noted, the Ittop down" perspective on 
implementation studies adopts the view of the manager or senior official 
attempting to enforce a policy (Dunsire, 1978). Rather than merely pro- 
viding a catalog, as in the search for perfect administration, this litera- 
ture does attempt to aid the manager faced with that task (Rosenthal, 
1982). As a consequence, much of this literature is managerially oriented, 
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seeking to improve the structure of organizations or the compliance of 
organizational members, in order to more closely approximate perfect ad- 
ministration. The development of managerial tools such as PERT, or or- 
ganizational devices such as  organizational development, are all directed at 
improving the functioning of public organizations and making policy on the 
street as  closely approximate policy in the central office as  possible. 
The Bottom Up Perspective. One of the two major theoretical approach- 
es to implementation has been termed "backward mapping,tT or the ltbottom 
up" approach. This approach to implementation studies may have the 
greatest potential detrimental effect on the development of policy studies. 
The fundamental point of this approach to implementation is that the most 
important activity in policy determination takes place at the lowest level of 
the organization. Rather than hierarchical control or  control by law and 
rules, policy is determined by the bargaining (explicit or implicit) between 
members of the organization and their clients. Therefore, programs must 
be compatible with the wishes and desires, or at least the behavioral 
patterns, of those lower echelon officials. In this approach, however, that 
compatibility is almost certain because of the assumption that those lower 
echelons will eventually mold policy to suit themselves. 
It is certainly important to understand that "street level bureaucrats" 
have great influence over policies and programs (Lipsky, 1980; Yates, 
1977) .  We have argued so elsewhere (Peters, 1984) and it  is a worthwhile 
caution for those who develop public programs. However, this useful tonic 
should not be taken as the sole cure for what ails public policymaking. 
There are two quite explicit problems in using backward mapping or the 
bottom up perspective as the organizing rule for implementation studies. 
The first problem arises i f  one accepts fully the descript ive generaliza- 
tion about implementation being determined largely by the lower echelons in 
organizations also as a prescr ip t ive statement. If that is the case, then 
many ideas about policy control in democratic political systems must be 
questioned. Some organization theorists have argued for decades, that 
lower echelons of an organization do have greater information about the 
situations within which a policy is actually being put into place. That is 
not, however, the same as saying that those charged with policymaking 
should abrogate their responsibilities to make policy to those who may have 
more information. There are certainly administrative situations in which 
higher levels of decentralization would be efficacious (Kochen & Deutsch, 
1980), but that decentralization should be understood within the context of 
some centralized control. This position is summarized nicely by Hogwood 
and Gunn's (1984, p. 208)  critique of the bottom up approach: 
Even in the case of central-local relations, however, we find it 
difficult to see why the view from the top is necessarily less 
valid than that from other levels.. . , If a Home Secretary is com- 
mitted to better relations between policemen and black youths, 
should w e  view with equanimity the persistence of 'street level' 
police attitudes and actions which are openly racist? If Par- 
liament decided to move from left-hand to right-hand drive on 
our roads, would we be happy to leave to 'negotiation' between 
road users,  local authorities and the central government such 
questions as when, how and whether the change-over should 
occur? 
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The examples are hyperbolic, but the fundamental point remains: gov- 
ernance is not about negotiation, it is about the use of legitimate authori- 
ty. While most writers on implementation have discussed the "bottom up" 
view from an empirical perspective, the normative implications are quite 
obvious, and at times the empirical and the normative are not separated, 
as when Elmore comments on the virtues of discretion and the absence of 
uniformity (1982).  
If one adopts a less extreme position and instead tries to tailor policies 
to values and operational patterns in the lower levels of public organiza- 
tions, one encounters a second danger in relying on the backward mapping 
approach: what should be done becomes defined by what can be done by 
existing organizations with minimal disruption. This is stated rather expli- 
citly in some work on implementation. Elmore (1982) argues that policy- 
making should be understood first in terms of the organizational processes 
of those charged with implementing a program and the effects which those 
actions have upon the presumed targets of government activity. It would 
appear that this implies that goals for policymaking then evolve from an 
understanding of what it is possible to do within the existing organization- 
al framework. In this way, backward mapping is similar to the "garbage 
can modelT7 of organizational behavior (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972) in 
which goals derive from activities. 
Backward mapping may describe quite adequately how implementation 
occurs in a decentralized policymaking environment. The question, how- 
ever, is whether this is the most appropriate model for policymaking 
viewed from a more normative stance. By saying we should do what we 
can do with minimal disruption, and that we should do what those already 
in public organizations prefer to do, appears to place a mortmain over the 
actions of government. Reliance on ease of implementation as a guide for 
action is as potentially undesirable when applied to means as to ends. We 
may encounter difficulties in choosing mechanisms for accomplishing goals 
as well as in choosing goals. The choice of instruments in policymaking 
has perhaps as many normative and efficiency implications as the choice of 
goals (Linder & Peters, 1984). 
The problem of relying on "backward mappingT1 in the choice of policy 
instruments is amply demonstrated by the selection of Medicare as the 
mechanism for addressing the medical problems of the elderly. Medicare 
was designed as a social insurance program because American government 
had had experience in implementing such programs and it was perceived 
that a social insurance program would be easier to administer than other 
programs. Unfortunately, however, Medicare depends upon copayments 
and deductibles and is particularly unsuitable for the medical needs of the 
elderly whose earning capacity is not sufficiently elastic to meet increasing 
levels of payments demanded; such payments are, however, a quite common 
part of insurance programs intended, rightly or  wrongly, to provide disin- 
centives to excessive utilization (Jackson & Peters, 1980).  Implementation 
has not been the problem for Medicare, even though the program involves 
a number of actors including large numbers of private providers. Rather, 
the problem is that the program was not designed adequately to meet the 
needs of its target population. 
Lane (1983) has discussed the analytical weaknesses of backward map- 
ping by explicating the potential differences in policy intentions of "for- 
mators" and implementators. He argues that the formator's goals are crucial 
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to the analysis of implementation and that to say that any implementation 
effort has been successful i f  the wishes of the implementor have been 
executed is extremely weak empirically: i t  borders upon a tautology. This 
ignores for the potentially serious normative implications of the approach. 
Lane argues that : 
Even i f  a great deal of implementation analysis has focussed sin- 
glemindedly on the formator of policy and even i f  a naive as- 
sumption about the possibility of hierarchical control has plagued 
much of public administration--as Elmore states--it is hardly 
fruitful to reverse these exaggerations in the opposite direction 
making the implementor the sole crucial party to the implementa- 
tion game. It is not clear what is meant by a "behavior that 
creates the occasion for a policy intervention" ; there is practi- 
cally no limit to the number of instances of such behavior that 
the scholar may find, but how are they to be selected i f  one 
cannot study them all. A necessary component of an implementa- 
tion perspective is the enactment of a set of goals by an enactor 
o r ,  as mentioned in the introduction, a formator. The goals of 
the formator may not be precise o r  clear, and they may change 
Over time or be in conflict with the goals of the implementor. 
Yet, without inclusion of the formator and the goals enacted the 
implementation has no determinate focus. If there are no goals 
enacted, how could there be anything to be implemented? 
Thus, to place excessive emphasis on the goals of the implementor weakens 
the concept of implementation and deprives it of much of i ts  empirical con- 
tent. It is a truism that Itstreet level bureaucratsfT have a great deal to 
do with the success or failure of public programs, and a great deal of em- 
pirical and theoretical mileage can be gained by careful analysis of their 
discretion (Mashaw, 1983; Davis, 1976). However, to place goal definition 
in the hands of that element of the public sector (empirically, analytically 
or managerially) is to admit defeat and the inability of the policymaking 
hierarchies in government to function effectively to produce governance. 
The forward mapping approach may e r r ,  as Elmore points out,  in assuming 
that those in nominal charge of public organizations and public programs 
do indeed control them. The backward mapping approach e r r s  equally, 
however, in accepting an empirical difficulty as both a normative statement 
and the sole basis of analysis of a complex organizational and political 
problem. Indeed, the tfhorrors of war" approach mentioned above, despite 
the apparent lack of analytic rigor, may be a better starting point because 
i t  recognizes that those elected by the public to government should be able 
to place their policies into action (Rose, 1974). 
Evolution and Backward Mapping. Closely related to the "bottom up" 
approach is the evolutionary approach initially fashioned by Pressman and 
Wildavsky (1973) and developed further in some of Wildavskyts later wr i t -  
ings (Majone & Wildavsky, 1978). The basic point of this approach to 
implementation is that,  as Heraclitus said long ago, we cannot step into the 
same river twice. The world of policy and implementation is changing con- 
tinually and thus "policy" itself is continually changing. As in the back- 
ward mapping approach, policy evolves during the process of being im- 
plemented rather than being imposed by central policymakers. As such 
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llpolicyll has no life of i t s  own but is a construct emerging from interac- 
tions. This ignores goals of central political decisionmakers in favor of 
developing understandings and bargains among actors involved in imple- 
mentation. 
The evolutionary approach (Majone & Wildavsky , 1978) communicates m 
important truth about policymaking and implementation, but i t  is not 
entirely clear how this aids the analysis of implementation. Implementation 
becomes a tautology: implementation was a success because what was imple- 
mented became the policy. This is certainly t rue,  but i t  does not aid the 
analyst attempting to assess the effects of different forms of organization 
or different types of policy instruments. Implementation has an important 
linkage to evaluation research and without a better conceptualization of the 
meaning of implementation, evaluation research is doomed to failure--or 
perhaps to finding excessive success. 
Some types of policies may be more precisely defined than others, but 
the empirical argument that policies and their consequences are not neatly 
contained is no substitute for a more positive normative stance stating that 
w e  need to understand the effects of policy more precisely and that any 
approach to policy analysis which regards effective evaluation research as 
impossible or virtually inevitable may be fundamentally flawed. We must 
agree in part that the interaction of political actors in implementation is 
indeed important. However, i t  is important only to the extent that i t  al- 
lows policymakers to be successful in implementing policies. 
Understanding interaction is crucial, but i t  is a means to the end and 
not the end itself. This may be taken (unfortunately) as an extremely 
authoritarian statement by some interested in the power of subordinates in 
public organizations. It is not intended as such. Rather, it is intended 
as a statement positing good democratic values that those who are elected 
to occupy central positions in governments are elected to make policy. 
They may well have to bargain in making their policies, but this does not 
deny that the success or failure of governments is to some degree deter- 
mined by their success in getting policies put into effect. If the i m -  
plementing classes do not like that then perhaps they should stand for 
elcction at the next opportunity. 
From the Bottom Down. A fourth approach to implementation analysis, 
advanced in the work of Nlazmanian and Sabatier (1983), adds concern for 
program evaluation to the emphasis of the top-down approach on the limits 
of administration. The concept of implementation failure is extended to 
include the failure of programs to attain their stated objectives. In this 
instance, implementing organizations are engaged not so much in rear- 
guard action as in accommodative maneuvers intended to deal with external 
threats and other exigencies of the program's environment. Hence, this 
approach to implementation views the process from the bottom down in that 
it focuses on the lower echelons of administration but is still concerned 
with implementing more centrally determined goals. 
Program environments are viewed as complex and turbulent, posing spe- 
cial problems for even the most conscientious implementor. Some problems 
are associated with the response of the very groups whose behavior or  
characteristics a given program is intended to change. For example, they 
may resist change or respond in unintended or unproductive ways. Other 
problems arise in connection with structural and political factors, such as 
socioeconomic conditions and levels of public support. In this approach 
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environmental variables are thought to exert a substantial influence on 
both the process and end-result of implementation. 
In common with the top-down view, this approach has confidence in the 
ability of central authorities to coordinate and, under favorable circum- 
stances, to control implementation. However, this is accomplished not 
through the imposition of hierarchy and procedure stressed by the top- 
down view but through properly fashioned legal mandates. A proper 
mandate includes a precise and unambiguous statement of objectives, suffi- 
cient fiscal and political resources, and a reasonable basis for both expect- 
ing and obtaining desired change. Thus, assuming an hospitable environ- 
ment, central authorities can shape implementation through refinements in a 
given program's organic statutes. 
The logic of this argument is quite familiar to scholars in public law 
and public administration: administrative discretion can and should be 
structured with carefully stipulated delegations of authority. What makes 
its substance appear novel in the context of implementation is the added 
concern for program effectiveness. Structuring discretion is important 
foremost as a prerequisite to programmatic success rather than as a juri- 
dical principle. Moreover, aside from their implications for administration, 
objectives stated with precision provide the only valid benchmark for as- 
sessing program performance. 
In contrast to other approaches to implementation, the bottom-down view 
is preoccupied with the nexus between environment and policy machinery. 
Flaws in the implementation component of this machinery are best dealt 
with by employing (in BardachIs words) a YamperproofY1 legal imperative. 
From this perspective, the ideal case is one in which the interaction of 
central authority and implementators, so essential to both the evolutionary 
and backward-mapping views, is effectively preempted. The more difficult 
task from the bottom-down view lies in confronting environmental factors, 
like intransigent groups and intractable problems. 
With the range of concerns expressed by the approaches to implementa- 
tion described above, one might conclude that there is no overarching im- 
plementation perspective. Nevertheless, the approaches spring from the 
same basic root and share a common focus on governmental organizations as 
endogenous political actors. Further, the approaches share a concern with 
feasibility and with the causes and cures for policy failures. We will ex- 
plore the common themes and examine their implications for policymaking in 
the second half of the paper. Throughout this discussion the design per- 
spective serves as a countervailing view intended to addresss the excesses 
of the implementation perspective. 
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The discussion of the implementation literature has obviously been criti- 
cal of some of the work in that tradition and of the unexamined implica- 
tions of that literature for policymaking. It is true that much of the lit- 
erature discussed is intended to be more descriptive than prescriptive, but 
the focus of so much of the policymaking literature on implementation prob- 
lems appears to indicate that i f  those problems were solved, the problems 
of making policies would also be solved. 
We argue in favor of a more diverse approach to policy selection by 
government. Such an approach would be concerned with implementation, 
We do not share that view. 
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but only as one of a number of conditions which must be fulfilled for 
successful policymaking. W e  also would argue that the selection of policies 
should depend first upon the selection of goals and then mechanisms for 
attaining those goals should be developed. Policy should be made foremost 
on the basis of what we want to do, not what we can do easily. 
The logical response by implementation scholars is that we are free to 
have all the goals we wish, but i f  we cannot implement programs related to 
those goals then the goals are of little importance. There are several pos- 
sible rejoinders to that position. The first is that goal clarification at the 
outset may prevent adopting programs or policy instruments which are at 
odds with our own normative positions or  which make goal attainment less 
likely. 
Another possible rejoinder is that policy selection on the basis of goals, 
even i f  those goals are not attainable in the short-term, may begin pro- 
gress toward achieving those goals, while choosing policies more on the 
basis of what can be done may be counterproductive. Thus, greater at- 
tention to goals at the outset of policymaking may enable us to develop an 
incremental Strategy toward achieving ends,  or  enable development of more 
creative designs for achieving desired ends. A s  Dryzek (1983) pointed 
out,  unconscious reliance on the existing programs and policy options seri- 
ously detracts from the ability of the public sector to achieve desired and 
desirable ends. If  nothing else, willingness to make policies on the basis 
of feasibility may waste resources and create stocks of goods and services 
which will make putting a more desirable program into effect more difficult 
(Hogwood & Peters, 1985). 
The option to unconscious choice is a more conscious pattern of choice 
based upon some ideas of policy design. The idea of design is to link to- 
gether values, models of causation, and the choice of instrumentation so 
that better choices can be made. This need not be a technocratic choice, 
but only a better means of guidance for policymakers than incrementalism, 
reasoning by analogy, and reliance on feasibility to guide the choice of op- 
tions. 
DIAGNOSING POLICY FAILURE AND THE Rx FOR SUCCESS 
Despite different emphases among the views of implementation examined 
earlier, all have the core idea that implementation represents a quagmire 
for policy goals. Further, conditions for successfully negotiating this 
quagmire demand a high, but fair, price. Although the exact nature of 
the price and i ts  implications for policy goals differ from one v i e w  to an- 
other, all see it serving an important function in policymaking. 
For the top-down and bottom-down views, the price of implementation is 
a pragmatic test for objectives. Paying the price is a matter of enduring 
the rites of passage. In effect, implementation subjects policy goals to a 
trial-by-fire which eliminates the objectionable and ill-conceived and tem- 
pers the rest. A s  a result, policy formulation becomes disciplined by the 
prospects of failure. With proper sacrifices to feasibility, most policy 
goals can be attained. However, the social value of attaining these "reha- 
bilitated" goals is entirely another matter, a separate question better left 
outside implementation analysis. Accordingly, prescriptions for success 
take the form of recipes for avoiding failure, detailing the necessary prep- 
aration for the rigors of implementation. 
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From the bottom-up and evolutionary views, the price exacted by imple- 
mentation serves as  an effective rationing device for government activity. 
Broad designs are screened out, encouraging what Wildavsky (1979) has 
called a strategic retreat on objectives. The price in the evolutionary 
view is repeated modification and adjustment. Goals that persevere remain 
in a state of flux, constantly adapting to changing circumstances and ad- 
justing to new constraints. For the bottom-up view, the price is bargain- 
ing and compromise. Goal adjustment in this instance involves mutual ac- 
commodation between the central authority and the implementors. 
Both views stress the inherent value of implementation in terms that ap- 
peal to democratic values. More specifically, this process seems to offer 
an additional set of checks and balances against "arbitrary" use of cen- 
tralized power. Hierarchy is out, local control is in; planning is out, in- 
teraction is in;  and finally, design is out,  accommodation is in. The pre- 
scriptions for avoiding policy failures which emerge from the bottom-up 
and evolutionary views offer little solace to the prospective reformer. Ef- 
forts to alter the dynamics of the process to make i t  more lenient toward 
objectives, or at least more forgiving, are likely to fall prey to the same 
forces motivating those efforts in the first place. Thus, only two basic 
routes to success remain; either pay the price of implementation, effective- 
ly relinquishing control over the direction of policy, or  court disaster with 
initiatives that must remain intact. 
The diagnosis of failure and corresponding prescriptions for success 
advanced in each of the four views of implementation can be illustrated in 
four diagrams. To simplify, only the 
barest bones of the process are represented. Similarly, the arrangement 
of these elements follows the metaphor of a rudimentary, mechanical sys- 
tem. Three elements are included: formulation machinery, encompassing 
central authorities and formulation functions; implementation machinery, 
including groups and organizations involved in implementation; and finally, 
the environment, subsuming both target groups and contextual factors ex- 
ternal to the other two elements. 
The arrows connecting the elements represent the direction of influence 
among them. For our purposes, this influence can be understood as  a de- 
cisive factor shaping policy. There are a number of asterisks appearing 
over certain arrows and next to selected elements. Each asterisk locates 
the origin of the symptoms diagnosed by a particular view as  policy fail- 
ure. Most prescriptions for avoiding failure are intended to relieve these 
symptoms. Accordingly, they concentrate on the presumed origins of the 
symptoms Asterisks appearing in parentheses represent minor sources of 
symptoms deserving some, but relatively less, attention. 
The first diagram at the top of Figure 1 represents the bottom-up view 
of implementation. Here, the implementation machinery exerts a decisive 
influence over policy. This influence bears on the formulation machinery 
through restraints on acceptable policy objectives and demands for discre- 
tion over important details. Influence on the environment is felt through 
authoritative changes in behavior or characteristics of target groups with 
requisite resources to back them up. Policy fails when either the formula- 
tion machinery refuses to operate on those terms or  target groups offer 
resistance to the intended influence. 
In both cases the symptoms of failure emerge as obstacles to the flow of 
influence. With a sleight-of-hand these empirical difficulties are 
These appear together as Figure 1. 
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transformed into normative statements. Prescriptions to avoid failure are 
remarkably simple: remove the obstacles. The conception of policy success 
here is premised on an unfettered flow of influence outward from the im- 
plementation machinery. The would-be formulator, then, is left to develop 
ways of accommodating this influence. 
FIGURE 1 
A Schematic Sumnary o f  Views o f  Implementation 
and t h e  Design Perspect ive 
Dlaprar 11 The bttmilp Vim 
Envlronrent 
* 
Diagram I :  The Evolutionary Vim 
d 
The evolutionary view--a somewhat modified, bottom-up perspective--ap- 
pears in the next diagram. In this instance, the environment is of rela- 
tively little bearing on either the shaping of policy or i ts  prognosis. Policy 
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is effectively determined by interaction of the formulation and implementa- 
tion machineries. Failure occurs when this interaction is disrupted or 
biased toward the machinery of one or the other. To a large extent, 
prescriptions are based on restoring the balance of humors necessary to 
sustain interaction and to promote policy adaptation. Success resides in 
mutual accommodation. 
The top-down view and i ts  modified bottom-down version appear in the 
next two diagrams. There are several conspicuous differences from the 
preceding diagrams. First, influence flows from formulation to implementa- 
tion machinery, but not vice versa. Formulation is attributed primarily to 
the central authority and i t s  integrity is allegedly maintained throughout 
the process. And secondly, none of the sources of failure are thought to 
be located along the paths of influence. Rather, failure emerges from 
symptoms within the machinery or from environmental factors. 
The top-down view of failure locates its symptoms squarely in the im- 
plementation machinery. Environmental problems are largely manifestations 
of these implementation difficulties. Following the same logic established 
above, these difficulties translate into prescriptions for success: flaws in 
the implementation machinery must be corrected or at least circumvented. 
The bottom-down view acknowledges these symptoms and the necessity 
for some corrective action but views the environment as the more serious 
source of difficulties. In this case, the environment is thought to exert a 
direct influence over policy determination. A s  a result, the prescription 
for avoiding failure is relatively less straightforward. Efforts must be 
made to make the environment more hospitable to policy. 
The last diagram in Figure 1 depicts the design perspective. Since the 
design perspective eschews the leap of the implementation views from empi- 
rical difficulties to prescriptions, there are no empirical flows of influence 
shown. Moreover, the representation is intended to be ex ante rather 
than ex post,  so no one set of implementation or formulation machinery 
need be indicated. Instead, we are given a range of choices over formula- 
tion and implementation machines and a set of plausible environments. 
The design perspective confronts prescription explicitly, rather than by 
inference from imputed policy failures. A s  a consequence, tradeoffs among 
higher-ordered goals, such as equity, replace feasibility as the driving 
force behind policy reform. Notice that the diagram for design represents 
distinct opportunity sets in place of the causal descriptions of process ap- 
pearing above it.  Here policy emerges as the product of a mapping across 
the four choice sets which identifies a particular mix of goals, machines 
and environments (for a contrast see Bardach, 1980). The concern is not 
with the etiology of various mixes but with their comparative merits. 
Moreover, each form of failure discussed earlier is represented as a choice 
error.  Responsibility for error ,  then, is allocated to each of the separate 
components of the policy rrmixrf rather than to flows of influence, the im- 
plementation machinery, or the environment. 
CONCLUSION: CHANGING THE COURSE OF INQUIRY 
Our most fundamental critique of the existing implementation literature 
has been its tendency, particularly manifest in the bottom-up approach, to 
conflate empirical and normative statements. As noted, there has been a 
pronounced tendency to translate empirical statements about implementation 
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difficulties into normative statements about how implementation should 
proceed. This arguably has moved policy studies away from developing 
better mechanisms for designing policies and designing implementation 
systems. This paper therefore can be seen as a plea for greater con- 
sideration for the application of carefully considered design criteria in pol- 
icy formulation. 
This paper is also a more general plea for the social sciences to deal 
more systematically with the normative implications of their work. A s  is 
evident in the implementation literature, there is a tendency to quickly 
translate empirical observations into implicit ideal types, and to then ex- 
tract evaluative statements from that ideal. Thus, criteria tend to be in- 
ferred from the llsuccessfl of some systems, and are then applied to other, 
potentially quite different situations. Further, the notion of success most 
commonly used is a rather conservative one stressing stability and equili- 
brium. 
If observations of the state of the world at one time and in one place, 
or reconstructed logics of social dynamics, become entrenched as  normative 
standards of performance, then a chilling conservatism can arise within our 
social theories and our policy advice. Several examples may help illuminate 
this point. 
A commonly cited example of this mode of theorizing is development the- 
ory. For example, Rostow's (1960) ideas about the stages of development 
in Western, industrialized countries were quickly translated into evaluative 
and normative statements about the way in which economic development 
should (or had to?) occur in emerging nations. Similarly the Almond and 
Coleman (1961) and Almond and Powell (1966) ideas concerning political de- 
velopment appeared to posit that political development was teleological and 
would eventually produce political systems similar to those in the Western 
democracies. Therefore, policy advice deriving from these approaches 
would be directed at producing political systems such as  those with which 
we are most comfortable. This certainly does fit our own values about 
good government, but i t  is not necessarily drawn on any logic inference 
from theory. Similarly, translation of empirical observations about how 
politics appears to function in the United States (Dahl, 1961) into pre- 
scriptive statements about how governments can function most effectively 
(Dahl, 1971) makes the same logical error.  Clearly, because we value a 
certain form of government, that form of government appears "natural1' and 
appears to be right. There is little logical reason, however, to assume 
that this is the case. The logical error appears akin to that which might 
be made by a social anthropologist who, after squatting in the village of a 
remote tribe for some years, deduces the nature of the good society based 
upon those observations. 
Closer to the subject of this paper, the gradual transformation of the 
incrementalism literature from a description of the somewhat chaotic pat- 
terns of policymaking in the United States into normative statements about 
how budgeting and policymaking more broadly should be conducted also 
illustrates the subtle shift from empirical observation to prescription. 
Wildavsky (1964) brilliantly described the processes by which incremental 
solutions were used in the budgetary process in the United States. Like- 
wise, his statistical treatments of these results (Davis, Dempster & Wildav- 
sky,  1966, 1974) confirm the adequacy of that description. However, 
when that description becomes translated into statements (Wildavsky , 1978) 
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about how budgets should be made--based in large part upon "feasibility" 
and language close to that arguing for ease of implementation--then we 
have moved from description to prescription. Such prescription might be 
adequate i f  the only criterion worthy of consideration were feasibility. 
Quite clearly, that is not the only criterion which should be applied to the 
allocation of resources through the public sector. 
We have largely refrained from singing hymns in praise of "good sci- 
ence" in this discussion in large part because the hypothetico-deductive 
model of science which is taught as the t'scientific method'? seems to fall 
into some of the same logical traps as does the social science work dis- 
cussed here. The model of science which has been promulgated is a re- 
constructed logic more than a logic-in-use but has been made into a model 
of how science should be practiced. Such an approach does not leave ade- 
quate room for personal intuition and tthunches7t which critics of the con- 
ventional model of science have argued to be of great importance (Polanyi, 
1958; Feyerabend, 1975).  Just reading the account of one of the greatest 
scientific discoveries of recent history would indicate the extent to which 
personal knowledge is important in the actual practice of science, and fur- 
ther the importance of scientific politics in the process (Watson, 1968).  
In challenging the implementation perspective, we have also questioned 
by implication the adequacy of an epistemology based soleIy on trial-and- 
error learning. This is not to say, however, that policy knowledge should 
never be treated as hypotheses subject to empirical testing or  that error is 
an inappropriate guide to theory refinement. The design perspective is 
not incompatible with these particular principles of ttpiecemeal social engi- 
neering." Rather, the implementation perspective has gone too far in 
stressing lessons of experience over critical appraisal of first principles. 
The version of trial-and-error learning in the implementation literature 
offers too narrow a view both of what constitutes a trial and which kind of 
error is most relevant to policy reformulation. Typically, a trial is some 
intervention intended to serve certain stated purposes. However, the 
purposes and the intervention are taken uncritically as given. Error, 
then, is defined solely in terms of deviations from the stated purposes of 
the intervention. Consequently, policy learning and reform occur as a 
purely adaptive, unreflective process holding much in common with more 
conservative versions of incrementalism. In the extreme, there would be 
no learning and no *'errorstt as stated intentions converge on what has 
been or  can be successfully implemented. 
A s  with incrementalism, emphasis on a particular conception of error 
carries over to a conception of the optimal intervention. For incrementalism 
in the extreme, minimizing the size and possibility of unanticipated conse- 
quences dictates that interventions be only marginal ones. Similarly, the 
implementation view finds that the best way to avoid deviations from stated 
intentions is to mold them to the range of predictable bureaucratic behav- 
iors and stable environments. 
At i ts  best, the implementation literature views trial and error as a 
means of validating a particular mapping of policy intentions into policy 
outcomes. A trial, in this sense, can be a research hypothesis about the 
causal details of the implementation process. Errors, then, are failures of 
model specification, measurement, o r  calibration. This conception overlaps 
with the ttevolutionarytt epistemology of Donald T. Campbell and his associ- 
ates in evaluation research. Unfortunately, it  also overlooks possible 
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conceptual errors in how policy research problems are defined and inter- 
ventions constituted, and omits a variety of valuative dimensions from its 
appraisal. Moreover, efforts to divorce this approach from the prescrip- 
tive concerns merely encourage the application of these results to a more 
precise definition of feasibility--grist for refining the "avoidance of imple- 
mentation errors" as the primary focus for policy formulation. 
In summary, much of the implementation literature has taken an empiri- 
cal point of some importance and developed a largely normative theory from 
it .  By so doing, attention has been diverted from the more important 
tasks of designing effective policies and effective implementation systems. 
It would appear that rather than admitting defeat and turning the potential 
domination of implementation by lower echelons of the public bureaucracy 
and the environment into a virtue, more attention should be given to 
mechanisms for formulating and implementing desirable policies. Such a 
reorientation will, in turn,  require a serious reexamination of the episte- 
mological roots of policy research. 
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